When is entry e¢ cient in markets with search and matching frictions? This paper generalizes the well-known Hosios condition to dynamic search environments where the expected match output depends on the market tightness. Entry is e¢ cient when buyers' surplus share equals the matching elasticity plus the surplus elasticity (i.e. the elasticity of the expected match surplus with respect to buyers). This ensures agents are paid for their contribution to both match creation and surplus creation. In search-theoretic models of the labor market, for example, vacancy entry is e¢ cient only when …rms are compensated for the e¤ect of job creation on both employment and labor productivity.
Introduction
The well-known "Hosios condition" (Hosios, 1990) characterizes e¢ cient entry in markets with search and matching frictions. 1 When there is entry of buyers, this condition states that entry is e¢ cient only when buyers' share of the joint match surplus equals the elasticity of the matching function with respect to buyers. 2 The condition has proven to be widely applicable across a broad range of search-andmatching models. For example, in the labor market, the Hosios condition tells us when the level of vacancy creation and therefore the unemployment rate is e¢ cient, e.g. see Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005) . In monetary environments with seller entry, such as Rocheteau and Wright (2005) , the Hosios condition determines when the level of seller entry and therefore the number of trades is e¢ cient.
While the Hosios condition applies to a broad range of search models, it does not always apply in settings where the expected match output -i.e. the expected value of the distribution of output across matches -is a function of the market tightness or buyer-seller ratio. 3 One example where this may occur is when sellers (or buyers) face a choice among heterogeneous buyers (or sellers) in many-on-one or multilateral meetings, e.g. the competing auctions environment in Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2014) . Another example is when there are sequential markets and agents in the …rst market face potential gains from trade in the second, e.g. the labor market and goods market in Berentsen, Menzio, and Wright (2011) .
In this paper, we provide a generalization of the Hosios condition that characterizes e¢ cient entry in a wide class of dynamic search-and-matching models where the expected match output depends on the market tightness. This simple, intuitive condition provides a unifying lens for understanding the e¢ ciency of entry in a range of search-and-matching models which may appear quite di¤erent on the surface.
Consider an environment with buyer entry. An equilibrium allocation is e¢ cient only when buyers are paid their marginal contribution to the social surplus. If the expected match output is exogenous, buyers need only be paid for their e¤ect on match creation, i.e. on the total number of matches. In such environments, the standard Hosios condition applies. If the expected match output is endogenous, however, buyers must also be compensated for their e¤ect on surplus creation, i.e. on the expected value of the joint surplus created by each match. We show that entry is e¢ cient only when buyers' surplus share equals the matching elasticity plus the surplus elasticity (i.e. the elasticity of the expected match surplus with respect to buyers). We call this the "generalized Hosios condition".
When the standard Hosios condition obtains, markets internalize the search externalities that arise through the frictional matching process. However, when the expected match output is a function of the market tightness, a novel externality arises: the output externality. Depending on the environment, this externality may be either positive or negative. When the standard Hosios condition holds, the output externality is not internalized and there may be either over-entry or under-entry relative to the e¢ cient level. For example, in labor markets featuring Nash bargaining, imposing the standard Hosios condition may lead to ine¢ ciently high unemployment because …rms are not compensated for their e¤ect on labor productivity. Only when the generalized Hosios condition obtains are both the search externalities and the output externality fully internalized by a market economy.
In the examples we consider, entry is typically e¢ cient when prices are determined by directed or competitive search -precisely because the generalized Hosios condition holds endogenously. Competitive search allows agents to trade o¤ prices against both the probability of trade and the expected match surplus if trade occurs, thus internalizing both the search externalities and the output externality. 4 In markets where prices are determined by Nash bargaining, however, the generalized Hosios condition does not hold and entry is generically ine¢ cient. Importantly, e¢ ciency cannot simply be restored by imposing the generalized Hosios condition through a particular choice of matching technology and bargaining parameter. 5 This is because the expected match surplus is endogenous and we cannot assume the surplus elasticity is constant. In this way, the generalized Hosios condition highlights the importance of competitive search as a way of decentralizing the e¢ cient allocation. 4 Generally, competitive search is e¢ cient because it enables agents to trade o¤ prices against the probability of trade. See the survey on directed and competitive search by Wright, Kircher, Julien, and Guerrieri (2017) . It is not always e¢ cient, however, as shown in Guerrieri (2008) . 5 By contrast, the standard Hosios condition is often imposed when calibrating search models with Nash bargaining by using a Cobb-Douglas matching technology and setting buyers'bargaining parameter equal to the constant matching elasticity, e.g. Shimer (2005) .
Overview. In Section 2, we …rst provide a simple example to build intuition and motivate our analysis. Next, we formulate the planner's problem and present two versions of our key result: the generalized Hosios condition. We …rst use the approach of Menzio and Shi (2011) to derive the condition in a discrete-time dynamic environment. While the proof is simpler using this approach -and the condition characterizes e¢ ciency for the entire equilibrium path, not just the steady stateit requires the assumption that match output is bounded. Next, we use an alternative approach to derive the result in a continuous-time environment. This approach delivers a steady state version of the generalized Hosios condition that does not require the assumption that match output is bounded. We also provide a corollary that determines when there is over-or under-entry under the standard Hosios condition.
Section 3 presents two examples. Section 3.1 considers the e¢ ciency of job creation in an environment that is inspired by the model of the goods market and labor market in Berentsen et al. (2011) . In this setting, the labor market tightness a¤ects the expected match "output" because it in ‡uences the expected gains from trade in the goods market by a¤ecting the goods market tightness and thus the probability of trade. The output externality from vacancy entry is always positive. When wages are determined by Nash bargaining, job creation is generically ine¢ cient. However, competitive search (wage posting) can decentralize the e¢ cient allocation by ensuring that the generalized Hosios condition holds endogenously. 6 Section 3.2 discusses two related environments in which meetings are many-on-one or multilateral. We …rst consider the e¢ ciency of vacancy creation in the labor market model of Mangin (2017) , in which …rms directly compete to hire workers and wages are determined by auctions. Market tightness a¤ects match output because greater competition to hire workers allows workers to be more selective, thereby increasing labor productivity. The output externality from vacancy entry is always positive. Next, we discuss the e¢ ciency of seller entry in the competing auctions environment found in Albrecht et al. (2014) . Market tightness a¤ects match "output" because it increases the expected value of the highest valuation among buyers who approach a given seller. The output externality from seller entry is always negative because greater seller entry decreases the buyer-seller ratio. In both examples, since prices are determined by competitive search (auctions), the generalized Hosios condition holds endogenously and the equilibrium level of entry is e¢ cient.
The Appendix provides additional examples and extensions that we describe in Section 3.3. One example, in particular, shows that competitive search does not always decentralize the e¢ cient allocation in environments where the generalized Hosios condition is necessary for constrained e¢ ciency.
Generalized Hosios Condition
To motivate our question and build intuition, we start with a simple example where the expected match output depends on the market tightness. In Sections 2.1 and 2.2, we then derive two general versions of our main results for dynamic economies.
Consider a static environment where …rms are ex ante identical and all workers are initially unemployed. All agents are risk-neutral. The measure of vacancies or …rms is v, the measure of unemployed workers is u, and the labor market tightness is v=u: Meetings are many-on-one or multilateral (i.e. many …rms can meet one worker). Speci…cally, the probability that n …rms meet a given worker is P n ( ) and we assume the meeting technology is Poisson, i.e. P n ( ) = n e n! . The matching probabilities for workers and …rms are therefore m( ) = 1 e and m( )= respectively.
After meetings occur, each worker draws an i.i.d. match-speci…c productivity x for every …rm he meets and then chooses to work for exactly one of them. Match output
x 2 X = fx L ; x H g R + ; where x L < x H and the probability of low productivity is 2 [0; 1]. The value of non-market activity is z 0 and we assume x L > z. Suppose workers are hired by the …rm they meet with the highest match-speci…c productivity. 7 A worker only produces output x L if all n …rms he meets draw x L , so the probability f (x L ; ) that a worker produces output x L (conditional n 1) is
Since P n ( ) = n e n! , we have 8
(2) f (x L ; ) = e (1 ) e 1 e :
The expected match output, or labor productivity, is
While the distribution of match-speci…c productivities is exogenous, the distribution of productivities across realized matches -i.e. matches actually chosen by workers -is endogenous and depends on the market tightness . In the limit as ! 0, we have f (x L ; ) ! . However, for any > 0, the probability f (x H ; ) that a worker produces output x H is strictly increasing in , and the expected match output y( ) is also strictly increasing , i.e. y 0 ( ) > 0. Intuitively, this is because a higher number of vacancies per unemployed worker allows workers to be more selective. We call this the selection channel.
What is the e¢ cient level of vacancy creation in this economy? Suppose the social planner can create vacancies at cost c > 0. We are interested in constrained e¢ ciency in the sense that the planner is constrained by both the matching technology m(:) and the output technology y(:) -or, equivalently, the distribution f (x; ). Taking both m(:) and y(:) as given, the planner is restricted to simply choose a market tightness to maximize the social surplus per worker, which is given by (4) ( ) = m( )y( ) + (1 m( ))z c :
Letting s( ) denote the expected match surplus, we have s( ) = y( ) z and (5) ( ) = m( )s( ) + z c :
Any solution P satis…es the …rst-order condition (6) m 0 ( )s( ) + m( )s 0 ( ) c and P 0; with complementary slackness. It can be shown that there exists a unique 8 This follows from the fact that e P 1 n=1 ( ) n n! = e (e 1) = e (1 ) e : solution P > 0 to (6) that maximizes ( ) provided that c < x L +(1 )(x H x L ) z. Let m ( ) m 0 ( ) =m( ); the matching elasticity, and let s ( ) s 0 ( ) =s( ), the surplus elasticity. Multiplying (6) by and dividing by m( )s( ), the optimal P satis…es
With free entry of vacancies, the total expected payo¤ for …rms equals cv; and the total surplus created by all matches is m( )s( )u, therefore the term on the right of (7) is …rms'surplus share.
We call this the "generalized Hosios condition". Like the original Hosios (1990) condition, it turns out that this simple condition characterizes e¢ ciency across a wide range of search-and-matching environments. In general, e¢ ciency requires that buyers' surplus share equals the matching elasticity plus the surplus elasticity because this ensures that agents are paid for their contribution to both match creation and surplus creation. In this example, e¢ ciency requires that …rms' entry decisions internalize the e¤ects of vacancy creation on both employment and labor productivity. In the special case where y 0 ( ) = 0, we recover the standard Hosios condition, which sets …rms'surplus share equal to the matching elasticity.
Dynamic economy (bounded output)
We now present two versions of the generalized Hosios condition for dynamic economies. First, we use the approach of Menzio and Shi (2011) to derive the condition in a discrete-time dynamic environment where match output is bounded. This approach delivers a condition that characterizes e¢ ciency across the entire equilibrium path, not just the steady state. In the next section, we use an alternative approach to derive a version of the generalized Hosios condition in a continuous-time dynamic environment. This approach delivers a steady state version of the generalized Hosios condition that does not require the assumption that match output is bounded.
Consider a discrete-time dynamic environment. In any period t 2 f0; 1; :::g, there is measure one of sellers and a large number of potential buyers. All agents are risk-neutral. The measure of buyers who enter is denoted by v and the measure of unmatched sellers is denoted by u. The market tightness is v=u. Buyer-seller matches are destroyed at an exogenous rate 2 (0; 1]: 9 The ‡ow payo¤ for unmatched sellers is z 0. Buyers and sellers are matched according to a constant-returns-to-scale matching function. The matching probabilities for sellers and buyers are denoted respectively by m( ) and m( )= . We call the function m(:) the matching technology.
Assumption 1. The function m(:) satis…es: (i) m 0 ( ) > 0 and m 00 ( ) < 0 for all
lim !1 m 0 ( ) = 0, and (vi) m( )= is strictly decreasing for all 2 R + .
Within each period, the timing is as follows. First, match destruction occurs. Next, buyers enter and the search and matching process takes place. Finally, production occurs.
Match output x 2 X fx 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x N g R + where x 1 < x 2 < ::: < x N . We assume that all matches have positive surplus. 10 While the distribution used here is discrete, the results also apply to continuous distributions provided that X is bounded, i.e. X = [x min ; x max ] where x min ; x max 2 R + and x min > z.
Given market tightness , the output of a new match is an i.i.d draw from a discrete probability distribution f : X ! [0; 1] where P x2X f (x; ) = 1. The distribution f (x; ) will be determined endogenously by features of the environment. The expected output of new matches is
If the distribution f (x; ) does not depend on the market tightness, i.e. f (x; ) = f (x), then y( ) = y 2 R + for all 2 R + . In general, however, the expected match output y( ) may depend directly on the market tightness. We call the function y(:) the output technology.
Let g : X ! [0; 1] be the probability distribution of match output x across all sellers in the economy. This includes newly matched sellers, unmatched sellers, and sellers matched in previous periods whose matches have survived. Here, g(x) denotes the measure of sellers producing output x, where x = 0 for unmatched sellers, so 9 In the special case = 1, the economy features non-enduring matches, i.e. all matches are destroyed at the end of each period. All of the following results therefore apply to economies with non-enduring matches. 10 In Appendix C, we provide an example of an environment where not all matches are accepted. P x2X g(x) = 1 u. The average match output across all sellers is P x2X xg(x) and the average output of matched sellers is
The distribution g is given by the following law of motion:
for all x 2 X; and the measure of unmatched sellers u is given by the standard law of motion:
Here,ĝ(x) is the distribution of match output across sellers, andû is the measure of unemployed workers, at the production stage, i.e. the beginning of the next period.
Planner' s problem
Suppose the planner can create vacancies at cost c > 0 each period. At the start of a period, the planner observes the aggregate state of the economy, = (u; g), and chooses a market tightness = v=u where 2 R + . The planner is restricted to take both the matching technology m(:) and the distribution f (x; ) as given, and chooses the market tightness to maximize the sum of present and future social surplus. The discount factor is 2 (0; 1). Letting^ = (û;ĝ) denote the next period's state, the Bellman equation for the planner's value function W ( ) can be written as:
subject to the following laws of motion:
(14)û = u(1 m( )) + (1 u) and (15)ĝ(x) = um( )f (x; ) + (1 )g(x) for all x 2 X:
Our planner's problem is a generalization of that considered in Menzio and Shi (2011) to environments where the distribution of output across new matches, given by f (x; ), is endogenous and may depend directly on the market tightness in that period. If match output is bounded, i.e. X is bounded, Theorem 1 in Menzio and Shi (2011) generalizes to our environment. 11 Lemma 1. Assume that X is bounded. (i) The planner's value function W ( ) is the unique solution to (12). (ii) W ( ) is linear in u and g:
where W u and W e (x) are the component value functions given by
Proof. Part (i). Letting C( ) be the set of bounded, continuous functions R : ! R with the sup norm kRk = sup 2 R( ), we can de…ne an operator T by
subject to (14) and (15), where the return function F is de…ned by (13).
11 More precisely, the special case of our planner's problem where f (x; ) = f (x) is a special case of that considered in Menzio and Shi (2011) . This is because the authors incorporate additional features -such as on-the-job search, aggregate productivity shocks, and signals regarding match-speci…c productivity. We abstract from these features to focus attention on what is novel here.
We …rst prove that T R is bounded. Consider any function R 2 C( ): Since R is bounded, there exist R 0 and R such that R 0 R(^ ) R for all^ 2 . Therefore, using (20) and (13), (T R)( ) is bounded below by minfz; x 1 g + R 0 and bounded above by maxfz; x N g + R.
Next, we prove that T R is continuous in . To do this, observe that since X is bounded we can replace the constraint 2 R + with the constraint 2 [0; ]; where is de…ned as:
For the modi…ed problem, the maximand is continuous in ( ; ) and the set of feasible choices for is compact, so it follows from the Theorem of the Maximum that T R is continuous in (Theorem 3.6 in Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott, 1989) . Therefore, T : C( ) ! C( ), i.e. the operator T maps the set of bounded, continuous functions into itself. It is straightforward to verify that T satis…es Blackwell's su¢ cient conditions for a contraction (Theorem 3.3 in Stokey et al., 1989) . Therefore, T is a contraction mapping and it has exactly one …xed point R 2 C( ). Since lim t!1 t R ( ) = 0 for all 2 , R is equal to the planner's function W (Theorem 4.3 in Stokey et al., 1989) . Part (ii). Let C 0 ( ) C( ) be the set of bounded, continuous functions R : ! R that are linear in the measure of unmatched sellers, u; and the measure g(x) of sellers producing output x. We have R 2 C 0 ( ) if and only if there exist R u and
Consider any function R 2 C 0 ( ). Substituting (14) and (15) into (13), and then substituting into the maximand in (20) and simplifying, we obtain
whereR u is given by (24)
and y( ) is given by de…nition (8), andR e (x) is given by
Therefore, we have T : C 0 ( ) ! C 0 ( ) and, since C 0 ( ) is a closed subset of C( ); we have W 2 C 0 ( ) by Corollary 1 to Theorem 3.2 in Stokey et al. (1989) .
We now use Lemma 1 to prove our main result. Proposition 1 says that the planner chooses to set buyers' surplus share equal the matching elasticity plus the surplus elasticity. When this condition holds, the level of buyer entry is e¢ cient because agents are compensated for their e¤ect on both match creation and surplus creation. Importantly, this intuitive condition characterizes e¢ ciency along the entire equilibrium path, not just in steady state. Moreover, in the absence of aggregate productivity shocks, the optimal market tightness is constant, i.e. t = for all t.
Assumption 2 is su¢ cient for the existence and uniqueness of the e¢ cient choice P . If Assumption 2 does not hold, (26) is still a necessary condition for e¢ ciency.
Proposition 1 (Generalized Hosios Condition). Assume X is bounded. There exists a unique e¢ cient allocation ( P t ) 1 t=0 where P t = P > 0 for all t and P satis…es
t=0 is e¢ cient if and only if t satis…es (26) for all t.
Proof. Rearranging (17), the socially optimal market tightness P is given by
We can write the expected match surplus as
and thus (27) can be rewritten as
Taking the …rst-order condition for (29), the optimal market tightness P satis…es
and P 0 with complementary slackness. If Assumption 2 holds, there exists a unique solution P > 0 that satis…es 0 ( ) = c where ( ) m( )s( ). Therefore, there exists a unique P > 0 that satis…es (30) with equality. Multiplying both sides of (30) by =m( )s( ), we obtain (26). Since P is unique, an equilibrium allocation is e¢ cient if and only if the equilibrium t satis…es condition (26) for all t.
The following provides a useful version of the generalized Hosios condition that is easier to apply in practice. It tells us that the derivative y 0 ( ) of the expected match output is key. If y 0 ( ) = 0, we recover the standard Hosios condition.
Proposition 2. Assume that X is bounded. There exists a unique e¢ cient allocation ( P t ) 1 t=0 where P t = P > 0 for all t and P satis…es
An equilibrium allocation ( t ) 1 t=0 is e¢ cient if and only if t satis…es (31) for all t.
Proof. From (28), we see that s( ) depends on the market tightness only through y( ) and W e ( ). The component value function W u does not depend on since it is a maximized value given by (17). Di¤erentiating (28), we have
Using (18), we obtain
and, using the fact that W e ( )
(1 )y 0 ( ) 1
(1 ) :
Substituting (35) into (32) and simplifying, we obtain
Finally, substituting (36) into (26) yields condition (31).
While this approach delivers a powerful version of the generalized Hosios condition, one limitation is that Lemma 1 requires the assumption that match output is bounded. If match output is not bounded -for example, if the distribution f (x; ) is continuous and has unbounded upper support, X = [x min ; 1) -then Lemma 1 does not apply, and therefore Propositions 1 and 2 do not apply. Since many important applications feature unbounded upper support, we provide an alternative approach in the next section that does not require bounded match output.
Dynamic economy (unbounded output)
We now use an alternative approach to derive a version of the generalized Hosios condition in a continuous-time dynamic environment where match output is not necessarily bounded. This approach delivers steady state versions of Propositions 1 and 2 that apply to any distribution of match output f (x; ) with …nite mean.
Consider a continuous-time dynamic environment. At any time t, there is measure one of sellers and a large number of potential buyers. As in Section 2.1, all agents are risk neutral and the measure of buyers who enter is denoted by v t , the measure of unmatched sellers is denoted by u t , and market tightness is t v t =u t . Matches are destroyed at a rate 2 (0; 1] and the ‡ow payo¤ for unmatched sellers is z 0.
In continuous time, m( t ) and m( t )= t are now arrival rates rather than matching probabilities for buyers and sellers respectively, so Assumption 1 needs to be amended.
Assumption 1a. The function m(:) satis…es: (i) m 0 ( ) > 0 and m 00 ( ) < 0 for all
We assume that all matches have positive surplus. At time t, the output of a new match is an i.i.d. draw from a probability distribution with pdf f (x; t ) and a …nite mean. We de…ne
R xmax x min xf (x; t )dx, the expected output for new matches at time t. We assume a continuous distribution but the results easily extend to discrete distributions.
Let y t denote the average match output across all matched sellers at time t. Note that y t is not equal to y( t ), since y t is a weighted average across all active matches, i.e. both new matches and existing matches that have survived from earlier times. In Appendix A, we derive the following law of motion for y t :
and the law of motion for the measure of unmatched sellers is standard:
Before solving the planner's problem, we …rst derive an expression for the steady state expected match surplus, s( ) V B + V S U B U S ; where V S and V B denote the steady state asset values for matched sellers and buyers respectively, and U S and U B denote the steady state asset values for unmatched sellers and buyers respectively.
Lemma 2. With free entry of buyers, the steady state expected match surplus is
Proof. See Appendix A.
Planner' s problem
Suppose the planner can create vacancies at cost c > 0. At any time t, the planner observes the aggregate state of the economy, t = (u t ; y t ), and chooses a market tightness ratio = v=u where 2 R + . The planner is restricted to take both the matching technology m(:) and the output technology y(:) as given, and chooses the market tightness to maximize the sum of present and future social surplus. The discount rate is r > 0.
Given initial conditions u 0 and y 0 , the planner chooses t for all t 2 R + to maximize
Propositions 3 and 4 are steady state versions of the generalized Hosios condition presented in Propositions 1 and 2 that do not require bounded match output.
If Assumption 2 does not hold, (43) is still a necessary condition for e¢ ciency. 
The …rst-order necessary conditions are
The transversality conditions are lim t!1 e rt t u t = 0 and lim t!1 e rt t y t = 0: In steady state, we have _ u t = _ y t = _ t = 0 and therefore y( t ) = y t = y( ). Also, _ t = 0 and _ t = 0. Substituting into the …rst-order conditions, we obtain (50) m 0 ( )u + y 0 ( ) = cu;
(51) = y( ) z + c r + + m( ) ;
(52) = 1 u r + :
Substituting and into (50), then using (1 u) = m( )u and (39), yields
Using Lemma 2, we can write s ( ) s 0 ( ) =s( ) as the elasticity of the numerator minus the elasticity of the denominator:
Substituting (55) into (54), (53) is equivalent to (43). Both are necessary conditions for any steady state solutions P > 0. Assumption 2 implies there exists a unique P > 0 that satis…es 0 ( ) = c where ( ) m( )s( ), and therefore there exists a unique P > 0 that satis…es (43). We can apply Arrow's Su¢ ciency Theorem to prove that P is indeed a global maximum. 12 To show this, we formulate the current value Hamiltonian in terms of the state variablex t (1 u t )y t : Using (41) and
, the current value Hamiltonian as a function of state and control variables is
and the maximized Hamiltonian is M H (x; u) max 2R + H(x; u; ). Applying Arrow's Su¢ ciency Theorem, the solution P to (43) is a global maximum provided that M H (x; u) is jointly weakly concave in u andx:
To …nd (x; u) arg max 2R + H(x; u; ), we set (57) @H @ = cu 1 m 0 ( )u + 1 u(m 0 ( )y( ) + m( )y 0 ( )) = 0 and, di¤erentiating (57), we have (58) @ 2 H @ 2 = 1 m 00 ( )u + 1 u(m 00 ( )y( ) + 2m 0 ( )y 0 ( ) + m( )y 00 ( )) < 0;
provided that m 00 ( )y( )+2m 0 ( )y 0 ( )+m( )y 00 ( ) < 0 and m 00 ( ) < 0 since 1 < 0 and 1 > 0: Assumption 1a states that m 00 ( ) < 0 for all 2 R + and Assumption 2 says that 00 ( ) < 0 for all 2 R + where ( ) m( )s( ). In particular, in the special case where s( ) = y( ), Assumption 2 implies m 00 ( )y( ) + 2m 0 ( )y 0 ( ) + m( )y 00 ( ) < 0: Therefore, (x; u) is indeed a maximum and we have
where (x; u). Since u cancels out in (57) andx does not appear in (57), does not depend directly on u orx: Also, it can be veri…ed that neither 1 nor 1 depends on either u orx. 13 The function M H (x; u) is linear in bothx and u and it is therefore weakly concave, thus the solution P to (43) is a global maximum.
Again, we obtain a useful version of the generalized Hosios condition.
Proposition 4. There exists a unique steady state e¢ cient allocation P > 0 and it satis…es
A steady state equilibrium allocation is e¢ cient if and only if it satis…es (60).
Proof. Condition (60) is derived as an intermediate step in the proof of Proposition 3 as condition (53), which is shown to be equivalent to (43).
Discussion
In search-and-matching models with free entry of buyers, there are two standard externalities related to the frictional matching process: the congestion and thick market externalities. 14 Both of these search externalities are fully internalized by markets when the Hosios condition holds. In environments where the expected match output depends on market tightness, however, a novel externality arises. Depending on the speci…c environment, a higher buyer/seller ratio may either increase or decrease the expected match output and this e¤ect may not be internalized by the market. We call this the output externality.
When the standard Hosios condition holds, buyers'entry decisions fail to internalize the output externality and entry may not be e¢ cient. Applying the standard Hosios condition may therefore result in either over-entry or under-entry of buyers 13 Note that the co-state variables 1 and 1 for the current value Hamiltonian with state variables u t andx t are di¤erent to the co-state variables and for the current value Hamiltonian with state variables u t and p t . 14 The congestion externality is a negative externality that arises because a higher buyer/seller ratio reduces the matching probability of each buyer. The thick market externality is a positive externality that arises because a higher buyer/seller ratio increases the matching probability for each seller. relative to the e¢ cient level. Corollary 1 tells us that the direction of the ine¢ ciency depends only on the derivative of the output technology y(:) at the equilibrium . Since the standard Hosios condition holds, m 0 ( )s( ) = c and therefore we have 0 ( P ) = m 0 ( )s( ). Now, 0 ( ) = m 0 ( )s( ) + m( )s 0 ( ); and thus 0 ( P ) = 0 ( ) m( )s 0 ( ); so if s 0 ( ) > 0 then 0 ( P ) < 0 ( ). If Assumption 2 holds then 00 ( ) < 0 for all 2 R + and therefore 0 ( P ) < 0 ( ) implies that < P , i.e. there is under-entry of buyers. Similarly, if s 0 ( ) < 0, there is over-entry of buyers, > P . Using expression (55) for s ( ), and rearranging using (39), we have When y 0 ( ) > 0, the output externality arising from buyer entry is positive and the standard Hosios condition results in under-entry. Alternatively, if y 0 ( ) < 0; the output externality is negative and the standard Hosios condition results in over-entry of buyers. If y 0 ( ) = 0, there is no output externality and buyer entry is e¢ cient under the standard Hosios condition.
Returning to our motivating example, the standard Hosios condition would result in under-entry of vacancies, or ine¢ ciently high unemployment, since y 0 ( ) > 0 and the output externality is positive. Intuitively, this is because it does not incorporate the fact that higher job creation leads not only to lower unemployment for workers, but also higher labor productivity. In an alternative environment where workers instead apply to …rms, we would have y 0 ( ) < 0. In this case, the output externality is negative and the standard Hosios rule would result in over-entry of vacancies, or ine¢ ciently low unemployment. 15 Seller entry. When there is seller entry instead of buyer entry, the direction of the e¤ect of entry is reversed. Since the buyers'surplus share and the sellers'surplus share add to one, an e¢ cient P > 0 must satisfy
where ( ) is the expected payo¤ for sellers. If there is free entry of sellers at cost > 0, substituting ( ) = into (61) delivers the generalized Hosios condition for seller entry: When y 0 ( ) > 0, the output externality arising from seller entry is negative since = v=u and therefore y(:) is decreasing in the measure of unmatched sellers u. In this case, the standard Hosios condition results in over-entry of sellers. If y 0 ( ) < 0; the output externality from seller entry is positive and the standard Hosios condition results in under-entry. If y 0 ( ) = 0, there is no output externality and seller entry is e¢ cient under the standard Hosios condition.
Applying the condition
In any decentralized market, the equilibrium surplus shares of buyers and sellers will depend on the price determination mechanism. Depending on how prices are determined, the economy may or may not decentralize the e¢ cient allocationor, equivalently, the generalized Hosios condition may or may not hold. E¢ ciency arises only when the price determination mechanism ensures that both the search externalities and the output externality are internalized by a decentralized market.
Competitive search. If prices are determined by directed or competitive search, the generalized Hosios condition typically (but not always) decentralizes the e¢cient allocation. For example, we show that competitive search (price posting) can decentralize the constrained e¢ cient allocation in environments with bilateral meetings such as Example 3.1, where the expected match output depends on the market tightness (see Appendix B). We will also see in Example 3.2 that competitive search (auctions) can decentralize the e¢ cient allocation in environments with many-on-one or multilateral meetings. In both cases, the reason why competitive search delivers e¢ ciency is precisely because the generalized Hosios condition holds endogenously. This is because competitive search allows agents to trade o¤ prices against both the probability of trade and the expected match surplus if trade occurs, thus internalizing both the search externalities and the output externality.
Nash bargaining. Returning to our motivating example, suppose that wages are determined by Nash bargaining and workers' bargaining power is 2 (0; 1). With probability m( )= , …rms successfully hire a worker and receive a share 1 of the expected match surplus s( ). The equilibrium market tightness > 0 satis…es the following free entry condition: ; a well-known version of the Hosios condition. If the matching technology is Cobb-Douglas and m( ) has constant elasticity, i.e. m ( ) = for all 2 R + , we can restore e¢ ciency by imposing the Hosios condition. To do so, we make the following choice of parameter values: = 1 . This approach, used for example in Shimer (2005) , ensures e¢ ciency in search models with Nash bargaining, regardless of the value of the equilibrium . In environments where the generalized Hosios condition is necessary for e¢ ciency, however, it will generally not be possible to impose e¢ ciency in this manner. This is because the surplus elasticity s ( ) is endogenous and it will not typically be constant. Instead, competitive search is necessary for decentralizing the e¢ cient allocation.
Examples
We now present two main examples of search-and-matching environments where the expected match output depends on the market tightness. The Appendix contains additional examples and extensions, as described in Section 3.3.
E¤ect of labor market on goods market
One way in which the expected match output can depend on the labor market tightness is when there are sequential markets, such as a labor market and a goods market, and the possibility of trade in the goods market depends on the matching outcomes in the labor market. A classic example is Berentsen et al. (2011) , which features both a labor market and a goods market. We present a static, highly simpli…ed version of that model in order to focus attention. 16 Workers …rst sell their labor to …rms in the labor market and then purchase goods from …rms in the goods market. Importantly, while all workers can search in the goods market, only active …rms (i.e. …lled vacancies) can produce and trade in the goods market. In this way, the labor market tightness a¤ects the goods market tightness by a¤ecting the measure of …rms who search in the goods market. In turn, the goods market tightness determines the probability of trade for both workers and …rms. This implies that the labor market tightness a¤ects the expected match "output"because this includes both the direct match output in the labor market and the expected gains from trade in the goods market. 17
The labor market is a standard DMP style environment with bilateral meetings. The labor market tightness is = v=u and the matching probabilities for workers and …rms respectively are m( ) and m( )= where m(:) satis…es Assumption 1. There is free entry of vacancies at cost > 0 and all matches produce direct output y > z; where z 0 is the value of non-market activity for the unemployed.
In the goods market, the probabilities of trade for workers and …rms respectively are m G ( ) and q G ( ) m G ( )= , where is the ratio of sellers to buyers and m G (:) satis…es Assumption 1. Since all workers (including the unemployed) search but only active …rms search (i.e. those that have successfully hired a worker), we have = (m( )= )v=u = m( ): Since the unemployment rate is u( ) = 1 m( ), we have ( ) = 1 u( ).
Active …rms can produce a single unit of an indivisible good at a production cost c > 0. Unemployed workers value the good at v u > 0 and employed workers value the good at v e > v u c. We assume, for simplicity, that v u = c (i.e. trades in the goods market with unemployed workers do not have any surplus).
While there is no heterogeneity here, matches that are formed in the labor market face di¤erent outcomes in terms of the surplus created, depending on whether or not workers trade in the goods market. Match "output"x 2 X = [ y; y + (v e c)] and the distribution of output across matches is
and 0 otherwise. In the …rst case, the worker does not trade in the goods market and the match "output"x is just y. In the next case, the worker does trade and x equals the direct output y plus the total gains from trade in the goods market (for both the worker and the …rm). The expected match output in the labor market is y( ) = P x2X xf (x; ) and the expected match surplus is s( ) = y( ) z. Taking the expected value of the distribution f (x; ), we obtain A su¢ cient condition for Assumption 2 to hold is that y z > and m 00 ( )m( ) (m 0 ( )) 2 > 2 for all 2 R + . Applying Proposition 1, there exists a unique e¢ cient choice P > 0 and it satis…es (68 With competitive search and wage posting, on the other hand, the generalized Hosios condition holds endogenously and we always have constrained e¢ ciency. Appendix B shows how competitive search with wage posting can decentralize the e¢ cient allocation in environments such as this.
In this example, the output externality is positive, i.e. y 0 ( ) > 0 or y 0 ( ) < 0: Since 0 ( ) > 0 and dm G ( ) d > 0, an increase in the labor market tightness has a positive e¤ect on the expected gains from trade in the goods market through an increase in workers' probability of trade. This means that imposing the standard Hosios condition in the labor market would result in under-entry of vacancies and ine¢ ciently high unemployment. Since Berentsen et al. (2011) use Nash bargaining to determine wages and impose the standard Hosios condition in the labor market to calibrate their model, this may be quantitatively important.
Many-on-one meetings and competing auctions
We now consider two examples of environments that feature many-on-one meetings (where many buyers may meet one seller) and auctions. In a competing auctions environment, a large number of sellers compete to attract buyers by posting auctions. 18 Such an environment features the selection channel because the auction mechanism enables sellers to "select"the buyer with the highest valuation. The expected match "output" y( ) is increasing in the market tightness because more buyers per seller implies a greater expected value of the highest valuation.
Labor market: competing auctions with vacancy entry
Consider the labor market environment in Mangin (2017) . 19 Workers are identical sellers who post reservation wages to attract …rms and then auction their labor using second-price auctions. Firms are ex ante identical buyers who pay a cost c > 0 to enter and search for workers. The labor market tightness is v=u; the ratio of vacancies or …rms to unemployed workers. The meeting technology is Poisson and P n ( ) = n e n! is the probability that n …rms approach a given worker. The matching probability for workers is m( ) = 1 e .
Firms'valuations x of workers'labor are match-speci…c productivity draws that are private information. Valuations are drawn ex post (i.e. after meetings) independently from a distribution with cdf G with density g = G 0 > 0, …nite mean, and support X = [x 0 ; 1) R + .
It can be shown that the distribution of output across all matches has pdf (70) f (x; ) = g(x)e (1 G(x)) 1 e and the expected match output is given by
Mangin (2017) proves that y 0 ( ) > 0 for all 2 R + if G is well-behaved, i.e. if it satis…es a mild regularity condition. Therefore, the output externality from vacancy creation is always positive. Intuitively, a higher number of vacancies per unemployed worker allows workers to be more selective, increasing labor productivity.
We Mangin (2017) shows that when wages are determined through auctions, the equilibrium satis…es a condition that can be shown to be equivalent to (72). In the limit as ! 1, …rms'surplus share converges to the tail index G of the distribution G, where G > 0 only if G has unbounded upper support. 20 In general, the generalized Hosios condition holds endogenously and we have constrained e¢ cient vacancy entry.
In the special case where y( ) = y 2 R + , we recover the large economy version of the directed search model found in Julien, Kennes, and King (2000) , which is closely related to Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001) . In this special case, the standard Hosios condition holds endogenously and we therefore have constrained e¢ ciency. Albrecht et al. (2014) examines the e¢ ciency of seller entry in a competing auctions environment. The authors consider both ex ante and ex post buyer heterogeneity, as well as seller heterogeneity, and they prove that seller entry is always e¢ cient. In particular, Albrecht et al. (2014) identi…es a negative externality from seller entry called the business-stealing externality. When an additional seller enters, the seller "steals" potential buyers from existing sellers, thereby reducing the expected surplus for those sellers. Although they do not explicitly identify it, the generalized Hosios condition applies in their setting and it is the fact that this condition holds endogenously that ensures e¢ ciency.
Business-stealing: competing auctions with seller entry
Consider a simple version of their model featuring identical sellers with reservation value z = 0: Buyers are ex ante identical but heterogeneous ex post. Sellers pay a cost to enter and attract buyers by posting second-price auctions with reserve prices. The buyer-seller ratio is N B =N S . The meeting technology is Poisson and P n ( ) = n e n! is the probability that n buyers approach a given seller. The matching probability for sellers is m( ) = 1 e .
Buyers' valuations x are private information and are drawn ex post (i.e. after 20 The fact that G has unbounded upper support is thus important. See Proposition 2 in Mangin (2017) . The tail index is a measure of fatness of the tails of the distribution G. meetings) independently from a distribution with cdf G, density g = G 0 > 0; and support X = [0; 1].
The distribution of valuations of successful buyers has pdf (x) ) 1 e and the expected valuation of a successful buyer is given by
We can now directly apply Proposition 1. If E G (x) > c, then Assumption 2 holds and we have constrained e¢ ciency of seller entry if and only if the equilibrium satis…es the generalized Hosios condition for seller entry: Albrecht et al. (2014) show that an equivalent condition holds endogenously in this environment, and we therefore have constrained e¢ ciency of seller entry. 21 The output externality that arises in Example 3.2.1 also appears in Albrecht et al. (2014) due to the selection channel. Through the auction mechanism, sellers choose to trade with the buyer who has the highest valuation. From Example 3.2.1, we know that y 0 ( ) > 0 if the distribution G is well-behaved. Importantly, this is a negative externality with regard to seller entry since = N B =N S and thus y(:) is decreasing in the number of sellers. When there is a …xed number of buyers, more seller entry implies fewer buyers for each seller, thereby reducing the power of the selection channel.
The business-stealing externality is closely related to this negative output externality. Consider the expected surplus per seller, ( ) = m( )s( ). The business-stealing externality re ‡ects the fact that 0 ( ) > 0 and thus the expected surplus per seller is 21 In Albrecht et al. (2014) , the planner maximizes the total social surplus, ( )N S N S , where ( ) is the expected surplus per seller. The social surplus per buyer is B ( ) = ( )= = and the …rst-order condition for the planner's problem is 0 B ( ) = 0 ( )= ( )= 2 + = 2 = 0: Rearranging, the e¢ cient P satis…es 1 ( ) = = ( ) where ( ) 0 ( ) = ( ). Since the surplus per seller is ( ) = m( )s( ), we have ( ) = m ( ) + s ( ), which is equivalent to (75). decreasing in N S . In fact, since ( ) = m( )s( ), the "business-stealing" e¤ect can be decomposed into two e¤ects: the e¤ect on sellers'matching probability m( ); and the e¤ect on the expected match surplus s( ): Both e¤ects are clearly re ‡ected in the generalized Hosios condition via the matching elasticity and the surplus elasticity.
Other examples
Appendix B extends the competitive search (price posting) approach of Moen (1997) to an environment where the expected match output depends on the market tightness. Since the generalized Hosios condition holds endogenously in this economy, competitive search with price posting provides a way of decentralizing the constrained e¢ cient allocation in environments where Proposition 1 applies and meetings are bilateral, such as Example 3.1. (In environments where Proposition 1 applies and meetings are many-on-one or multilateral, competitive search (auctions) decentralizes the constrained e¢ cient allocation, as seen in Example 3.2.) Appendix C presents two related examples. The …rst example is a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) style model with bilateral meetings and job acceptance decisions. Since the cut-o¤ productivity for accepting a match depends on the market tightness, labor productivity also depends on the market tightness. It is well known that the standard Hosios condition characterizes e¢ cient entry in this environment. We show that, in fact, the generalized Hosios condition applies but it reduces to the standard Hosios condition simply because the positive e¤ect of vacancy entry on the expected match surplus and the negative e¤ect of vacancy entry on the job acceptance probability exactly o¤set each other.
The second example in Appendix C features …rms that are ex ante heterogeneous with respect to productivity. Since …rms'entry decisions are a¤ected by the probability of hiring and therefore the market tightness, labor productivity is also a¤ected by the market tightness and the generalized Hosios condition is necessary for constrained e¢ ciency. This example is related to the model of labor force participation found in Albrecht, Navarro, and Vroman (2010) . (In a follow-up paper to the present one, Julien and Mangin (2017) applies and extends the generalized Hosios condition to the environment in Albrecht et al. (2010) with labor force participation.)
Appendix D shows that competitive search does not always decentralize the constrained e¢ cient allocation in environments that require the generalized Hosios con-dition for e¢ ciency. We develop a dynamic model of the market for referrals that is inspired by the model of word-of-mouth communication in Campbell, Leister, and Zenou (2017) . Consumers cannot directly observe …rms'quality, but they can purchase "referrals". Proposition 1 does not apply directly in this environment since there is an additional law of motion for the distribution of traded goods' quality. However, we show that the generalized Hosios condition is still necessary for constrained e¢ ciency. With competitive search (price posting), the market internalizes both the search externalities and the direct component of the output externality (i.e. the impact of referrals on the average quality of goods traded in the current period). However, there is an additional externality -a dynamic composition externalitythat is not internalized. Consumers do not internalize the e¤ect of their decisions on future consumers through the impact of referrals on the dynamics of the quality distribution. As a result, competitive search does not deliver e¢ ciency. 22
Conclusion
This paper generalizes the well-known Hosios (1990) condition that characterizes e¢ cient entry in search-and-matching models. We extend this simple rule to dynamic search environments where the expected match output depends on the market tightness. Such environments give rise to a novel externality -the output externality -that is not captured by the standard Hosios condition. To ensure constrained e¢ ciency, markets must internalize the e¤ect of entry on both the number of matches created and the average value created by each match. We show that this occurs precisely when buyers'surplus share equals the matching elasticity plus the surplus elasticity. We call this intuitive condition the "generalized Hosios condition". When it holds, agents are fully compensated for the e¤ect of entry on both match creation and surplus creation. In search-theoretic models of the labor market, for example, vacancy entry and unemployment are constrained e¢ cient only when …rms are compensated for the e¤ect of job creation on both employment and labor productivity.
Appendix A: Omitted proofs
Proof of Lemma 2. In steady state, we have the following Bellman equations: Finally, substituting (83) into (82), we obtain expression (39).
Derivation of laws of motion in continuous time. The law of motion for the unemployment rate u t in discrete time is
and the law of motion for average match output y t is given by
In continuous time (dt ! 0), the laws of motion for u t andx t are
Also, sincex t (1 u t )y t , we have
and, rearranging, we have
Substituting in _ x t and _ u t from (88) and (87), and usingx t (1 u t )y t ; leads to:
Appendix B: Competitive search (posting)
It is well-known that competitive search equilibrium is typically (but not always) constrained e¢ cient in the sense that it decentralizes the planner's allocation (Shimer, 1996; Moen, 1997) . In competitive search models where the expected match output is constant, agents simply trade o¤ prices against the probability of trade. The fact that competitive search allows agents to do so is what delivers e¢ ciency. In environments where the expected match output depends on the market tightness, agents trade o¤ prices against both the probability of trade and the expected match surplus if trade occurs. Again, the fact that agents can do so is what delivers e¢ ciency.
Consider a simple competitive search model in the spirit of Moen (1997) . There is a continuum of submarkets indexed by i 2 [0; 1] and free entry of vacancies at cost c > 0: Workers in submarket i post the same wage w i and face the same market tightness i , the ratio of vacancies to workers in that submarket. Firms' search is directed by observing the posted wages and deciding which submarkets to enter. Within each submarket, workers and …rms are matched according to a frictional meeting technology. Matching probabilities for workers and …rms are m( i ) and m( i )= i respectively, where m(:) satis…es Assumption 1.
In any submarket, match output x 2 X = [x min ; x max ] R + where x max 2 R + [ f1g. In submarket i, match output is an i.i.d. draw from a probability distribution with pdf f (x; i ) and a …nite mean. Let y( i )
R xmax x min xf (x; i )dx, the expected match output. The ‡ow payo¤ for unmatched sellers is z 0 and we assume that x min > z. The expected match surplus in submarket i is s( i ) = y( i ) z.
The expected payo¤ for …rms in submarket i with wage w i and tightness i is
and the expected payo¤ for workers in submarket i with market tightness i is
Workers in submarket i choose a wage w i and market tightness i that solve (94) max
subject to ( i ; w i ) c and i 0 with complementary slackness. To induce participation by …rms in submarket i, i.e. i > 0, the constraint ( i ; w i ) c is binding:
Solving for w i as a function of i using (95), we obtain
Choosing a wage w i is thus equivalent to choosing a market tightness i where
and using (96), this is equivalent to
The equilibrium i satis…es the …rst-order condition
or, equivalently, the equilibrium i solves
The generalized Hosios condition holds endogenously within each active submarket i. If we consider a symmetric equilibrium in which …rms are indi¤erent across submarkets and all workers post the same wage, then i = for all submarkets i. If Assumption 2 holds, then Proposition 1 tells us that the equilibrium level of vacancy entry is constrained e¢ cient. While we consider only a static model here, the same result holds in dynamic environments where Proposition 1 applies. 23
Appendix C: Constrained planner
The expected match output may depend on the market tightness when agents make a decision about whether or not to enter the market, or whether to accept or reject a match, and that decision depends on the market tightness. In the next two examples, we consider such environments. Importantly, we assume that in choosing the market tightness , the planner is constrained not only by the matching frictions but also by the entry or acceptance decision rules that agents would choose in the decentralized equilibrium. This is because the function y(:), or equivalently, the distribution of match output f (x; ), arises as a consequence of these entry or acceptance decisions. Since the planner is restricted to take both the matching technology m(:) and the output technology y(:) as given, the planner is constrained by these. 24
Endogenous job acceptance
Consider the steady state of a continuous-time dynamic Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) style environment with a job acceptance decision. 25 Workers and …rms discount future payo¤s at a rate r > 0. The market tightness is = v=u and workers' arrival rate for meetings is m( ). After workers and …rms meet, a match-speci…c productivity x is drawn from a distribution with cdf G and density g = G 0 where g(x) > 0 for all x 2 X = [0; 1]. After observing the productivity x, workers and …rms decide whether to accept the match. There is free entry of vacancies at cost c > 0 and matches are destroyed at an exogenous rate > 0. The ‡ow value of non-market activity is z 0:
A job with match-speci…c productivity x is acceptable to both worker and …rm if and only if the match surplus S(x) 0: 26 There is a cut-o¤ productivity x such that all jobs with productivity x x are acceptable to both workers and …rms. We write x ( ) since the cut-o¤ productivity will depend on the value of unemployment U S and therefore on the market tightness. The probability a match is acceptable is a( ) = 1 G(x ( )) and the probability a worker is hired ism( ) a( )m( ).
The distribution of output across all realized (i.e. accepted) matches has pdf (101) f (x; ) = g(x) 1 G(x ( )) and the expected match output across all (accepted) matches is
where the equilibrium cut-o¤ productivity x ( ) is given by equating S(x ) = 0.
With free entry of …rms, it can be shown that S(x) = x rU S r+ , so we have x ( ) = rU S . Clearly, since the cut-o¤ productivity x ( ) depends on the market tightness, the expected match output y( ) also depends on the market tightness.
The planner chooses P to maximize the total social surplus net of entry costs. Importantly, we assume the planner uses the same cut-o¤ productivity rule as in the equilibrium, i.e. x ( ) = rU S . Solving the planner's problem yields the generalized Hosios condition. 27 In particular, the social optimum P must satisfy and di¤erentiating a( ) = 1 G(x ( )) yields
27 All of the results for this example can be easily obtained by modifying the proofs of Lemma 2, as well as Propositions 3 and 4, so that m( ) is replaced bym( ) = a( )m( ) throughout. 28 The adjusted steady state expected match surplus is given byŝ( ) = y( ) z+c r+ +m( ) :
Using (106) and (105), and the fact that
we obtain the following:
Combining x ( ) = rU S with the fact that (r + )ŝ( ) = y( ) rU S , we have (r + )ŝ( ) = y( ) x ( ). Substituting into (108), we obtain a ( ) + ŝ ( ) = 0, and substituting into (104), an e¢ cient P > 0 must satisfy
While the generalized Hosios condition (103) does indeed apply here, the standard Hosios condition is su¢ cient for constrained e¢ ciency. 29 Intuitively, this is because there are two o¤setting e¤ects of an increase in the market tightness : First, there is an increase in the cut-o¤ productivity x , which decreases the job acceptance probability a( ) since workers are more selective. Second, the increase in x leads to an increase in the expected match surplusŝ( ) for acceptable matches, since these matches have higher productivity. The fact that these two e¤ects exactly o¤set each other is re ‡ected in the fact that a ( ) + ŝ ( ) = 0; which implies the generalized Hosios condition reduces to the standard Hosios condition.
Ex ante heterogeneity and market composition
When there is ex ante heterogeneity among buyers or sellers, dependence of the expected match output on market tightness can arise naturally through market composition. If the market tightness in ‡uences the individual entry decisions of buyers or sellers that are ex ante heterogeneous with respect to characteristics that a¤ect match output, then average output per match will depend on market tightness. 30 We call this the composition channel.
Suppose there is a measure u of unemployed workers and a …xed measure M of …rms that may choose to search. Firms' productivities x are distributed according to a twice di¤erentiable distribution with cdf G and density g where G(0) = 0 and g(x) > 0 for all x 2 X = [0; 1]. Firms learn their own productivity before deciding whether to pay the entry cost c > 0 and search. Expected wages paid by a …rm with productivity x is w(x; ) x.
Let v be the measure of searching …rms and de…ne v=u. Meetings are bilateral and the probabilities of matching for workers and …rms are m( ) and m( )= respectively, where we assume m(:) satis…es Assumption 1.
A …rm with productivity x chooses to search for a worker if and only if (110) m( ) (x w(x; )) > c:
If @w(x; )=@x < 1, there is a unique cut-o¤ productivity x ( ) such that …rms enter if and only if x x ( ). 31 The distribution of output across matches has pdf
and the expected match output, or labor productivity, is given by
dx:
It can be veri…ed that x is strictly increasing in provided that @w(x; )=@x < 1. This is intuitive: as the market tightness increases, the probability of …nding a worker is lower so only high productivity …rms choose to pay the cost c and search. At the same time, the average match output y( ) is increasing in the cut-o¤ productivity x . Therefore, y 0 ( ) > 0 for all 2 R + and the output externality is positive. Suppose the planner chooses a market tightness to maximize the total social surplus minus the total entry costs. As in the previous example, we assume the planner uses the same cut-o¤ productivity rule x ( ) as in the decentralized economy.
(2011), Charlot, Malherbet, and Ulus (2013), and Masters (2015) . In a follow-up paper to the present one, Julien and Mangin (2017) applies and extends the generalized Hosios condition to the environment in Albrecht et al. (2010) . 31 This is true, for example, if wages are determined by Nash bargaining with < 1.
If Assumption 2 is satis…ed, there exists a unique social optimum P and we have constrained e¢ ciency if and only if satis…es the generalized Hosios condition in Proposition 1. 32 Since y 0 ( ) > 0, Corollary 1 implies that there is under-entry of …rms under the standard Hosios condition.
Appendix D: Endogenous quality dynamics
We now present an example that illustrates how competitive search may not always endogenize the generalized Hosios condition. In the model we present, an endogenous quality distribution arises through the possibility of "referrals". The model is closely related to -but di¤erent from - Campbell et al. (2017) , which presents a dynamic model of consumer sales with word-of-mouth communication through social networks. In our setting, the key variable is the ratio of referrals to consumers and the endogenous quality distribution is the probability that a traded good is low quality, i.e. the market share of low-quality …rms. We use competitive search to model the market for referrals (not goods) and consider whether the entry of sellers of referrals (not …rms) is constrained e¢ cient.
There is a …xed measure of consumers who seek to purchase one unit of a durable good. After purchasing the good, consumers exit the market and are replaced by new consumers. Goods are produced by a large number of competitive …rms of two types: high quality and low quality. The share of …rms that produce low quality goods is 2 (0; 1). 33 The low-quality good has quality x L and the high-quality good has quality x H > x L . The price of the good is p for both types of …rm.
Consumers cannot directly observe …rms'quality, but they can receive referrals. A single referral tells a consumer about the quality of a good purchased in the previous period. In each period t 2 f0; 1; :::g, the expected number of referrals per consumer is t (which is endogenous) and P n ( t ) is the probability a consumer receives n referrals at time t. This is a kind of "meeting technology" which matches referrals with consumers. If a consumer receives at least one referral, they pick the "best"referral and then choose whether to purchase from that …rm or instead choose a …rm randomly. 34 32 For example, if G is uniform on [0; 1] and wages are determined by Nash bargaining, Assumption 2 holds provided that c < 1=2 and < 1=2. 33 Since our focus is on the market for referrals, we do not endogenize the entry of low and high quality …rms as in Campbell et al. (2017) but instead assume that is exogenous. 34 If the consumer is indi¤erent between two referrals, they pick one at random.
If a consumer receives no referrals, they purchase the good from a random …rm, i.e. they buy a low-quality good with probability . Let t denote the market share of low-quality …rms, i.e. the probability that a good traded in period t is low quality. Low-quality goods are purchased only if all n of a consumer's referrals are to low-quality …rms (which occurs with probability n t ) and the consumer picks a low-quality …rm when choosing randomly (which occurs with probability ). We therefore obtain the following law of motion for t :
where 0 = 2 (0; 1). If P n ( ) is Poisson, i.e., P n ( ) = n e n! , we have
Both the selection channel and an additional channel are present. The selection channel implies that the average quality of a traded good is increasing in the number of referrals per consumer t since consumers can be more selective. An additional channel, which is a kind of dynamic composition channel, ensures that the quality distribution t itself evolves over time. This is because the market composition, i.e. the composition of the pool of referrals, depends on the previous period's t since referrals are only drawn from traded goods. 35 Suppose there is a large number of potential entrants who can pay a cost c > 0 to acquire information about a random good purchased in the previous period. This information can be sold to consumers as a "referral". In the market for selling referrals, consumers post referral fees and commit to paying a single fee for the best referral they receive. Similarly to the competitive search environment in Appendix B, consumers form a submarket i by choosing a referral fee r i and a ratio of referrals 35 In terms of our earlier notation, the law of motion for the distribution of quality across "matches", i.e. trades which occur when a consumer receives at least one referral, is given by
Since the distribution f t evolves over time and does not depend only on the current period's market tightness t , Propositions 1 and 2 do not directly apply in this setting. However, we will show that the generalized Hosios condition is also a necessary condition for e¢ ciency in this environment.
to consumers i to maximize their expected payo¤:
subject to the following condition for sellers of referrals:
and i 0, with complementary slackness. Here, m( i ) = 1 e i is the probability a consumer receives at least one referral, m( i )= i is the probability a seller is paid a referral fee, y( i ; ) is the expected quality of a good purchased if the consumer receives at least one referral, and y = x L + (1 )x H is the expected quality of a good purchased from a random …rm.
Using (117), the choice of a consumer in submarket i is equivalent to
and i satis…es the …rst-order condition (119) m 0 ( i )s( i ) + m( i ) @y( i ; ) @ i = c
where the expected match surplus is s( i ) = y( i ; ) y , i.e. the di¤erence between the expected quality in submarket i with and without receiving at least one referral. In symmetric equilibrium, i = for all submarkets i and satis…es If < 1 2 , there exists a unique steady state equilibrium ( ; ) where 2 (0; 1). 36 Now consider a planner who can directly choose the number of referrals per con-36 A detailed derivation of the steady state equilibrium can be found below. sumer : Importantly, while consumers take the distribution of quality as given, the planner takes the e¤ect of on into account. In the proof below, we solve the dynamic planner's problem subject to the law of motion for . The resulting steady state condition is identical to the one obtained when the planner maximizes the steady state social surplus per consumer, (122) ( ) = m( )(y( ; ( )) y ) + y c ;
where ( ) is given by (121) and (123) y( ; ( )) = (1 e (1 ( )) )x H + e (1 ( )) x L e y 1 e :
Using s( ) = y( ; ( )) y , the planner's …rst-order condition is equivalent to Comparing (126) with (120), it is clear that the economy is not e¢ cient. The decentralized market internalizes both the search externalities and the direct "output externality", i.e. the direct e¤ect of on the quality of traded goods via the selection channel. However, there is an additional externality arising from the use of referrals. This is re ‡ected in the term @y( ; ( )) @ 0 ( ), which captures the indirect or dynamic "output externality", i.e. the indirect e¤ect of via the dynamic composition channel. Since @y( ; ( )) @ < 0 and the market share of low-quality …rms is decreasing in the number of referrals per consumer at any equilibrium , i.e. 0 ( ) < 0, this is a positive externality that is not internalized by the decentralized economy. Therefore, the equilibrium number of referrals is ine¢ ciently low.
Proofs for Appendix D Equilibrium. In period t, the expected payo¤ for a seller of a referral in submarket i with referral fee r i;t and market tightness i;t is (127) ( i;t ; r i;t ) = m( i;t ) i;t r i;t c and the expected payo¤ for consumers in submarket i is (128) V ( i;t ; r i;t ) = m( i;t )(y( i;t ; t 1 ) r i;t p) + (1 m( i;t ))(y p)):
Consumers in submarket i choose a referral fee r i;t and market tightness i;t that maximize V ( i;t ; r i;t ) subject to ( i;t ; r i;t ) c and i;t 0; with complementary slackness. To induce participation by sellers in submarket i, i.e. i;t > 0, the constraint ( i;t ; r i;t ) c is binding:
(129) m( i;t ) i;t r i;t = c:
Using (129) to replace r i;t in V ( i;t ; r i;t ), the choice of a consumer in submarket i is (130) i;t = arg max i;t 2R + (m( i;t )(y( i;t ; t 1 ) y ) + y p c i;t ):
Di¤erentiating with respect to i;t , the …rst-order condition of this problem is (131) m 0 ( i;t )(y( i;t ; t 1 ) y ) + m( i;t ) @y( i;t ; t 1 ) @ i;t c = 0:
In symmetric equilibrium, i;t = t for all submarkets i and t satis…es (132) m 0 ( t )(y( t ; t 1 ) y ) + m( t ) @y( t ; t 1 ) @ t = c:
In steady state, t = t 1 = and t = t 1 = and any equilibrium ( ; ) satis…es To solve for the equilibrium, we use the fact that the average quality of a traded good in period t is given by (134) (1 t )x H + t x L = g( t ; t 1 ) + (1 m( t ))y where g( t ; t 1 ) m( t )y( t ; t 1 ). Using the fact that t = e t(1 t 1 ) , (135) g( t ; t 1 ) = x H xe t(1 t 1 ) e t y where x = x H x L . The …rst-order condition (132) is equivalent to (136) @g( t ; t 1 ) @ t m 0 ( t )y c = 0:
Di¤erentiating (135) with respect to t , this is equivalent to (137) (1 t 1 ) xe t(1 t 1 ) c = 0 and the second-order condition is (138) (1 t 1 ) 2 xe t(1 t 1 ) < 0.
Using the fact that t = e t(1 t 1 ) , this is equivalent to
In steady state, t = t 1 = and t = t 1 = and any equilibrium satis…es Planner. Given 0 = 2 (0; 1), the planner chooses f t g 1 t=1 to maximize the total discounted social surplus per consumer:
(143) (f t g 1 t=1 ) = 1 X t=1 t (m( t )y( t ; t 1 ) + (1 m( t ))y c t ) subject to t 0 and the law of motion for t :
(144) t = e t(1 t 1 )
The Lagrangian for this problem is (145) L = 1 X t=1 t (m( t )(y( t ; t 1 ) y ) + y c t ) + t ( t e t(1 t 1 ) ):
The …rst-order conditions are: (146) @L @ t = t (m 0 ( t )(y( t ; t 1 ) y )+m( t ) @y( t ; t 1 ) @ t c)+ t (1 t 1 ) e t(1 t 1 ) = 0 (147) @L @ t 1 = t 1 + t m( t ) @y( t ; t 1 ) @ t 1 t t e t(1 t 1 ) = 0 (148) @L @ t = t e t(1 t 1 ) = 0
In steady state, t+1 = t = and t+1 = t = , so we have (149) t (m 0 ( )(y( ; ) y ) + m( ) @y( ; ) @ c) = (1 ) e (1 ) (150) + t m( ) @y( ; ) @ = e (1 ) (151) = e (1 )
Rearranging (149), we obtain (152) = t (m 0 ( )(y( ; ) y ) + m( ) @y( ; ) @ c) (1 ) e (1 ) ;
and rearranging (150) Equating (152) and (153) Rearranging, and substituting in (151), we obtain (155) m 0 ( )(y( ; ) y ) + m( ) @y( ; ) @ @y( ; ) @
(1 ) 1 = c:
Implicitly di¤erentiating = e (1 ) , we have 0 ( ) = (1 ) =(1 ); and substituting 0 ( ) into (155) yields (156) m 0 ( )s( ) + m( ) @y( ; ) @ + @y( ; ) @ 0 ( ) = c:
Rearranging (156), we obtain (126). This is a necessary condition for e¢ ciency.
